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Three Assumptions Lawyers
Must Never Make
Brett G. Scharffs1

I. Introduction
“You did what!?” my Uncle bellowed.
“I assumed you saw me pass you,” I said defensively.
My Uncle Dick, no children of his own, had brought 13-year-old
me along on one of his epic bicycle treks down the California coast near
Carmel. Inevitably he ended up waiting for me to catch up, and when I
finally did, he was ready to hop back on his bicycle and begin peddling
again. For once, when I caught up, he was deep in conversation with
another cyclist on the side of the road. I waved and hurried on, savoring
the prospect of choosing my spot to rest and wait for him for a change.
Finally, I stopped and rested. So this is what it feels like to be out front,
I thought.
But when 30 minutes passed, I got nervous enough to climb on my
bike and pedal back. When I got to the spot where I had passed my uncle,
he was no longer there. Now I was concerned, and I decided I had better continue retracing my trail, although I couldn’t be sure that he hadn’t
passed me at some point during my rest. By the time I met up with him, he
must have been pretty worried, but all I saw was anger.
“You what?” he repeated.
“I assumed you . . .”
“You assumed?” he said sarcastically. “Spell it.”
I meekly complied. “A-s-s . . .”
“Stop. What does that spell?”
“Ass?” I answered doubtfully.
“Continue,” he ordered.
135
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“. . . u-m-e.”
“What does that spell?” he demanded.
I hesitated. “u . . . m-e?”
“That’s what assuming does,” he declared. “Makes an ‘ass’ out of ‘you’
and ‘me.’”
“Don’t ever assume,” he ordered, and to his credit my Uncle Dick
communicated the message with a directness and clarity that makes the
experience as vivid today as it was over 25 years ago.
II. Assumptions and Presumptions
Lawyers make assumptions many times every day. We may wish to
think that we are all about evidence and proof—Just the facts, ma’am—but
in reality, making assumptions is the bread and butter of our professional
lives. An assumption involves believing something to be true without sufficient grounds for knowing it to be true. When we assume, we take something for granted without proof.2 As lawyers we routinely make assumptions, sometimes formally,3 as when we write an opinion letter,4 sometimes
informally,5 as when we engage in stereotyping or attempt to exploit the
suspected prejudices of others.6
Closely related to assumptions are presumptions. A presumption
relieves a party in whose favor the presumption runs of the burden of
proof. “Legal presumptions . . . are not a ‘means of proof ’ . . . [but rather] a
dispensation of the need to furnish proof.”7 For example, we presume that
someone is “legally dead” when they have been absent for a given length
of time without evidence that they have been seen or heard.8 The most
famous presumption in the law is the presumption of innocence,9 but our
criminal system is based upon even deeper assumptions about individual
responsibility for one’s actions.10 Some presumptions are rebuttable, such
as when we presume that a child of a certain age is not capable of committing a crime.11
As lawyers we often have to make snap judgments, sometimes in
rapid-fire succession, which often are built on an undergirding of assumptions. We also make assumptions when we form a hypothesis and develop
evidence to prove our “theory of the case.” But while making assumptions
is a necessary and natural part of our professional lives, making assumptions can also get us into trouble. Making assumptions may reflect laziness or pride: laziness when we trust our impressions without doing the
hard work of verification, and pride when we close our eyes to evidence
contrary to our favored presuppositions. I want to suggest that lawyers
are particularly prone to mistakes that arise from making assumptions.
Let me explain.
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III. Three Perilous Assumptions
While it would be quite easy to compile a long list of assumptions that
lawyers are prone to make and that routinely cause lawyers grief,12 there
are three assumptions that pose particular peril to lawyers. It would hardly
be an exaggeration to say that these are three assumptions that a lawyer
must never make.
1. First, don’t assume you are the good guy.13 You probably are not.
2. Second, don’t assume you understand the other guy. You almost
certainly do not.
3. Third, don’t assume you are right. You are most likely wrong.
Now, please do not misunderstand me. It is as important for me to
avoid making these assumptions as it is for you. And, while you are probably not the good guy, you might well not be the bad guy either. You very
well may understand the other guy, in a partial and limited way. And you
are probably not entirely wrong. Although your spouse and I are certain
that you are not entirely right.
Unfortunately, avoiding these assumptions requires a large dose of
self-doubt, empathy, and humility, and there is precious little in our professional education or practice that helps us cultivate this particular set of
habits or traits of character. Indeed, our professional lives are organized
and structured in a way that almost compels us to make these particular
assumptions.
IV. The Organization and Structure of Our Professional Lives
What is it about the professional lives of lawyers that makes us particularly prone to assuming that we are the good guy, that we understand the
other guy, and that we are right? Three features of the legal profession are
of particular significance, each of which is closely related to one of these
three assumptions.
A. The Adversarial System
First and most obviously, ours is an adversarial profession, and this
means we take sides. There are two important implications of this rather
pedestrian observation. First, we tend to identify with the side we are on.
As we identify with our cause, we tend increasingly to think of it as being
good, or right, or just. Naturally, we come to think of ourselves as the good
guys. Second, we tend to caricaturize, villainize, or in extreme cases even
dehumanize our opponents. This tendency is a well-documented feature
of rivalries, feuds, and war.14 While this tendency is hopefully less severe
in the law than when facing a mortal enemy, there is still a strong propensity to think of the other side as the bad guys. The reality, of course, is
likely much more complex, and in most situations there will be good and
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bad, right and wrong, as well as the potential for abuse on both sides. As
Isaiah Berlin said, quoting Immanuel Kant, “Out of timber so crooked as
that from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be built.”15
This risk of assuming you are the good guy is particularly acute for prosecutors, who quite naturally view themselves as being on the side of truth
and justice. But prosecutors are in a uniquely powerful position and face
a particular proclivity to abuse the weapons at their disposal. For example, I have an acquaintance who was indicted nine years ago for securities fraud. For nearly a decade he was bullied and hounded by prosecutors
who never quite got around to pursuing or resolving his case. From time
to time he was threatened with a lengthy prison sentence, and the government attorneys tried to cajole him into being a witness against his father,
who had been in business with him. Over this period of almost 10 years, he
spent more than a hundred thousand dollars on lawyers’ bills. Finally, on
the eve of trial, the government offered him a deal. He pled guilty to one
misdemeanor. The negotiated description of his alleged misconduct was
so technical that even as a professor who teaches securities law it was difficult to discern exactly what he had done wrong. Nevertheless, this criminal indictment hung over his head for nearly 10 years, caused many sleepless nights, and took a toll on his marriage, not to mention his relationship
with his father, which has been all but destroyed.
I suspect the prosecutors in this case have little or no idea the ordeal
they put this man through. Indeed, they probably think they showed
statesmanship and restraint in allowing him to plead to a lesser offense
and avoid prison. They probably assume they were the good guys and that
they let him off easy.
B. Stereotyping
A second reason we make unwarranted assumptions relates to the
ways in which we rely upon stereotypes. As lawyers we are in the business of making quick assessments. We often deal with people or situations
that seem quite familiar, and we become adept at noting patterns and similarities. After years of practice we lawyers may come to believe that there is
nothing we haven’t seen before.
One of my mentors, Dean Anthony Kronman, has argued that legal
training, especially the case method, cultivates in students an attitude of
“moral cosmopolitanism that is best expressed, perhaps, by the old Roman
motto nihil humanorum alienum meum est, ‘nothing human is foreign to
me.’”16 Lawyers are less likely to be gullible than they were before beginning their legal training, but they are also less likely to be trusting, and are
unlikely to be surprised by human selfishness and perfidiousness. Having
seen so much so many times, it becomes easy for lawyers to mistakenly
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think they know exactly what is going on when they encounter a situation
that looks very familiar.
We assume we understand the other guy because we have become
expert in assessing situations and people. This can lead us to making
confident, and often inaccurate, assumptions about people or situations
based upon a paucity of real evidence. Thus, one of the most common
quips about lawyers is “Often wrong, never in doubt.” We may jump to
conclusions too quickly. For example, we are all familiar with how biases
and prejudices of various types tend to become more hardened and
extreme as we grow older.
C. Passing Judgment
Closely related to assumptions made when stereotyping are assumptions made when passing judgment. As lawyers we are constantly passing
judgment on others: Are they telling the truth? Can they be trusted? Are
they virtuous or vicious? Over time we get better at making snap judgments. The tendency to pass judgment emphatically and confidently grows
stronger as we gain experience and expertise—indeed, simply as a facet of
growing older. As we age, our mode of problem solving gradually changes
from one based upon analysis and calculation to one based upon pattern
recognition. In his book The Wisdom Paradox, neuroscientist Elkhonon
Goldberg describes this process:
Frequently, when I am faced with what would appear from the outside to be a
challenging problem, the grinding mental computation is somehow circumvented, rendered, as if by magic, unnecessary. The solution comes effortlessly,
seamlessly, seemingly by itself. What I have lost with age in my capacity for
hard mental work, I seem to have gained in my capacity for instantaneous,
almost unfairly easy insight.17

Today some people urge us to believe that the immediate judgments we make in a blink of an eye are more accurate and reliable than
the decisions we make when we engage in a lengthy process of investigation, thought, and deliberation. For example, in his book Blink, Malcolm
Gladwell describes an experiment involving student evaluations of
teachers. A psychologist gave students “three ten-second videotapes of a
teacher—with the sound turned off—and found they had no difficulty at
all coming up with a rating of the teacher’s effectiveness.”18 When the clips
were cut back to five seconds, “the ratings were the same.” These ratings
were “remarkably consistent even when she showed the students just two
seconds of videotape.” When these snap judgments were compared with
evaluations made by students after a full semester in a professor’s class,
the outcomes were essentially the same. “A person watching a silent two-
second video clip of a teacher he or she has never met will reach conclusions about how good that teacher is that are very similar to those of a
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student who has sat in the teacher’s class for an entire semester. That’s the
power of our adaptive unconscious.”19
But our instantaneous judgments and snap assessments are almost
certainly incomplete and quite probably wrong. Why?
For one thing, our stereotypes and judgments often rest upon prejudices that we don’t even suspect we possess. For example, in the past 30
years since putting up screens between musicians auditioning for orchestra jobs and the committees evaluating them has become commonplace,
“the number of women in the top u.s. orchestras has increased fivefold.”20
Another cause of our proclivity to judge imperfectly is the human
capacity for self-deception, which is surely one of our most highly developed capacities. Consider the hypocrite who beheld the mote (a small particle or speck of dust) in his brother’s eye, but failed to consider the beam
(a large piece of timber or metal that is long in proportion to its thickness) that was in his own eye.21 Why is it that we have such a keen eye
for spotting self-deception in others, but a big blind spot for recognizing
it in ourselves? Part of the reason, I suspect, is that we tend to judge ourselves based upon our intentions, whereas we judge other based upon their
actions.
V. Corrective Actions
I would like to suggest several concrete steps we can take to counteract
the tendency to make unwarranted assumptions, including the assumption
that we are the good guy, the assumption that we understand the other
guy, and the assumption that we are right.
A. Keep an open mind
First, when trying to counter these powerful assumptions, it is important to keep our minds open to contrary evidence. Myson of Chen, one of
the Seven Sages, advised, “We should not investigate facts by the light of
arguments, but arguments by the light of facts.”22
Judge Learned Hand is often considered the most influential American
judge who was never on the Supreme Court. Judge Hand was famous for
the painstaking and evenhanded approach he took to the law. Justice Felix
Frankfurter occasionally referred to Hand as the “modern Hamlet,” and
Hand’s biographer, Gerald Gunther, noted that Hand “was uncertain about
the proper result in most cases, even after decades of judicial experience.”23
Hand believed that every judge should first and foremost entertain the
possibility that he or she might be mistaken. Hand said:
Of those qualities on which civilization depends, next after courage, it seems
to me, comes an open mind, and, indeed, the highest courage is, as Holmes
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used to say, to stake your all upon a conclusion which you are aware tomorrow
may prove false.24

The truth is we may not be the good guy and we almost certainly do
not understand the other guy. This is not only because we have not walked
the proverbial mile in his moccasins, we often lack the imagination and
empathy to even consider what such a journey might look and feel like.
A few years ago I wanted to learn more about the word “empathy,” so
I looked it up in my 13-volume Oxford English Dictionary. Imagine my
surprise when the word “empathy” was nowhere to be found in the “E”
volume.25 Upon reflecting on my treatment at the hands of my tutors as a
student at Oxford, it seemed to me quite fitting that this was a concept that
was not even a linguistic possibility at Oxford.26
One reason why we sometimes trust our assumptions more than we
should is that we mistake having our assumptions vindicated with having
them justified. Consider prejudice and stereotyping. Perhaps I believe that
Mormon men are narrow-minded and sexist, even though I haven’t really
ever known any Mormon men. I have heard this about Mormons and have
no reason to doubt that it is true. I meet a Mormon man and he behaves
in a way that I view as being narrow-minded and sexist. My assumption
about Mormon men has been vindicated. I saw what I was expecting to
see. I can say emphatically that every Mormon man I have met is narrowminded and sexist. With this firsthand experience, my assumption about
Mormon men will likely become even stronger, and my sense that my
assumption is valid will be stronger, too. Indeed, after a few more verifying
experiences, I probably won’t even view this as an assumption, but rather
a fact.
But the fact that one of our assumptions has been vindicated does not
mean that it is or was justified. Justification involves having a sufficient
basis in reason for believing something to be true. A belief that Mormon
men are narrow-minded and sexist is only justified if, based upon a broad
array of evidence and proof, a general rule can be inferred from a large
number of cases. Even then, a justified belief will probably be qualified by
a variety of caveats and limitations that have emerged from our observation of numerous examples of the phenomena in question to account for
exceptions and variations.
It is easy to mistake vindication as justification, especially given our
tendency to give more weight to evidence that confirms our presuppositions and to discount evidence that calls our assumptions into doubt.
Perhaps this explains why many members of minority groups are so sensitive to portrayals of members of their groups that reflect stereotypes. The
American writer Jessamyn West once observed, “We want the facts to fit
the preconceptions. When they don’t, it is easier to ignore the facts than
to change the preconceptions.”27 This tendency to ignore facts that do not
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fit our preconceptions, while problematic for everyone, can be even more
problematic for the lawyer. As La Rochefoucauld memorably said, “There
is nothing more horrible than the murder of a beautiful theory by a brutal
gang of facts.”28 Many a courtroom lawyer has witnessed the massacre of
their beautiful theories.
B. Be a Skeptic, Not a Cynic
A second protective measure against making unwarranted assumptions lies in the distinction between being a skeptic and a cynic. When
I was a student, Dean Guido Calabresi repeated like a mantra, “For a lawyer skepticism is necessary, cynicism devastating.” What is the difference
between being skeptical and being cynical, and why is it important that
a lawyer be one, but dangerous if he or she is the other? I had thought of
the two terms as more or less synonymous. In time, however, I began to
understand what Dean Calabresi may have meant by this distinction.
A lawyer must be skeptical. We see people acting at their self-
interested worst. Clients do not always tell the truth, even to their lawyers.
Memories tend to be selective and self-serving. Opposing counsel often
engage in grandstanding and gamesmanship. A lawyer cannot afford to
take things at face value; the unexpected and improbable must be foreseen
and planned for. How things will look in litigation must be anticipated at
a time when partners seem to see eye to eye. Lawyers encounter human
beings treating each other with almost inconceivable indifference and
brutality. Lawyers know too much to be completely trusting.
But a lawyer must not be cynical. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines a cynic as “one who shows a disposition to disbelieve in the sincerity or goodness of human motives and actions, and is wont to express this
by sneers and sarcasms.”29 The cynic exhibits contempt rather than compassion. Believing the worst of others serves as grounds for treating them
with disregard.
To be skeptical is to doubt whether someone is telling the truth; to
be cynical is to doubt whether there is such a thing as truth, or whether
being truthful matters at all. To be skeptical is to be unsurprised by
human selfishness; to be cynical is to maintain that there is no such thing
as selflessness. To be skeptical is to realize that people sometimes behave
in ways that are insincere or deliberately hurtful; to be cynical is to disbelieve in the human capacity for sincerity or goodness. To be skeptical is to
recognize that we are each capable of evil; to be cynical is to believe only
the worst about each other. To be skeptical is to recognize that matching
means to ends can be difficult and controversial; to be cynical is to believe
that one’s ends always justify one’s means. One can be doubtful, wary, and
watchful without being contemptuous, sneering, and sarcastic.
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A skillful, cynical legal technician is dangerous, the more dangerous
for being the more skilled. In your practice as lawyers, there will be times
when it will prove more difficult than you can possibly imagine to keep
your skepticism from degenerating into cynicism. Especially at moments
of extremity, it is useful to ask ourselves whether we have crossed the line
from skepticism to cynicism. If we have, or if we cannot say for certain
that we have not, we should be alarmed—not only out of concern for the
damage we may work but also out of concern for the welfare of our own
souls.
C. Doubt Thyself
A third way in which we can avoid some of the pitfalls of unwarranted
assumptions lies in having a measured tentativeness about our own opinions, even those we hold strongly. In 1958, at age 87, Judge Hand delivered
the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School. To the dismay of many in the audience, he expressed doubt about the correctness
of the recent school desegregation cases. But, quoting Benjamin Franklin,
Hand acknowledged his doubts about his own conclusions:
Having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by better information or fuller consideration to change opinions even on important
subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore
that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to
pay more respect to the judgment of others.30

Unfortunately, this attitude does not seem to be characteristic of
most of us as we grow older. The more common tendency is to become
more set in our ways, more committed to our previous viewpoints, and
more unwilling to reassess honestly our prior conclusions. Charles Alan
Wright suggests that “[i]n spite of being a modern Hamlet—or, more
likely, because of it—Learned Hand is firmly enshrined in the small group
of judges who universally are regarded as great.”31 Simply being unsure or
indecisive is not what made Hand great; rather, it was his open mind, his
willingness to entertain opposing possibilities and to characterize each in
its best possible light, and his capacity to understand and feel the independent force exerted by each side of an argument.
In cautioning us about the perils of passing judgment, I am not making a postmodernist observation about the impossibility of differentiating between good and evil. There is a difference between right and wrong,
good and bad, light and dark, and we can know it.32 But most truths are
partial, and all human perceptions are imperfect. Too often we draw a
stark dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity, when in reality our
perceptions are objective, subjective, and relative—objective due to the
character and traits of the thing being perceived, subjective due to the
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character and traits of the person doing the perceiving, and relative due to
outside factors such as the color and frequency of light. For example, when
I conclude that you acted courageously, it is partly based upon something
you did, partly based upon my own values and perceptions, and party
based upon the contingencies of the situation.
VI. Conclusion
My purpose has not been to denounce all assumptions. To the contrary, I have suggested that our work as lawyers requires us to make
assumptions. Rather, my purpose has been to highlight certain assumptions that pose particular peril for lawyers, not only because they can lead
us astray, but because they engender a kind of professional arrogance and
hubris for which lawyers are all too famous.
Whereas the adversarial system drives us to think of ourselves as the
good guy, if we try to keep an open mind and strive to develop empathy,
if we remain willing to alter our preconceptions when facts are contrary to
our suppositions, then we will be more open to the possibility that we may
not be completely in the right. Whereas the necessity of making snap judgments and our increasing capacity to recognize patterns creates a strong
tendency for us to assume that we understand the other guy, if we subject our stereotypes to verification, if we temper our skepticism before it
degenerates into cynicism, if we genuinely strive to develop empathy, then
we may retain the capacity for reassessment and correction. And whereas
we may get better at exercising judgment as we grow in expertise and even
wisdom over years of deliberate practice, if, like 87-year-old Judge Learned
Hand, we can retain a healthy measure of self-doubt, then our judgments
may be tempered by a measure of humility and open-mindedness that
may enable us to transcend our natural inclinations and limitations, in life
as well as in the law.
This Spirit of the Law address was given at byu Law School on March 9,
2005. Reprinted from the Clark Memorandum, fall 2005, 10–19.
Brett G. Scharffs was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University in 1989 and
received his jd from Yale University in 1992. He clerked for Judge David
B. Sentelle of the u.s. Court of Appeals for the d.c. Circuit 1992–93. He is
currently Francis R. Kirkham Professor of Law and associate director of the
International Center for Law and Religion Studies at J. Reuben Clark Law
School.
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Notes
1. I am grateful to Danny Walker and the Spirit of the Law Board for the invitation to speak today. I wish to thank Marjorie Fonnesbeck Layne for her kind and
capable research assistance. This article is dedicated to the richly wrathful Richard
Wrathall, my wonderful Uncle Dick. I love you. Copyright © 2005 Brett G. Scharffs.
2. There are numerous related definitions of the term “assumption” that illustrate additional dimensions of the phenomena, including pretending to possess, as
to “assume a virtue, if you have it not”; or taking something as one’s own, to appropriate, or usurp, as in to “assume an honor.” Synonyms include, to “put on, counterfeit, sham, affect, pretend, simulate, feign.” Making assumptions is more related to
appearance than to reality. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 70
(10th ed. 1994).
3. An example of a formal assumption in the law is the policy of inferring that
someone who is engaged in obfuscation is trying to hide something. For example, the law assumes that someone who pays child support is hiding something
when he resists discovery of detailed financial information. See Philip G. Seastrom
& Michelle L. Kusmider, Family Law Corner: Child Support and the High Income
Earner, 41 Orange County Lawyer 40, 41 (1999).
4. I once heard a lawyer brag that when he gave a validity opinion in connection with a securities offering, it was so filled with qualifications and disclaimers
that a careful reading would reveal that he had actually said nothing that was not
either based upon a stated assumption or a declaration in an officers certificate
upon which he explicitly relied.
5. One of the most problematic examples of informal assumptions in the law
is racial profiling. See Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-balanced Fourth Amendment:
Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 851
(2002). Cooper explains:
Racial profiling does not provide information; it collapses all potential
information around the assumption about behavior derived from the stereotype
about one characteristic. Whereas a description of a suspect simplifies merely for
purposes of proper identification, a racial profile takes very broadly defined characteristics and associates any individual owning those characteristics with bad
behavior.

Id. at 872.
6. To gain advantages for their clients, attorneys often exploit the suspected
prejudices of jury members. In an attempt to combat the effect of jury prejudice in a case involving an altercation between a black student and a white student in Anchorage, Alaska, the defense lawyers for the black student proposed a
jury instruction that required the jury to engage in a “race-switching exercise” to
assure they were not relying on racial-stereotype thinking. See James McComas
& Cynthia Strout, Combating the Effects of Racial Stereotyping in Criminal Cases,
23 Champion 22 (1999). A portion of the proposed jury instructions describing the
“race-switching exercise” is as follows:
To ensure that you have not made any unfair assessments based on racial
stereotypes, you should apply a race-switching exercise to test whether stereotypes
have affected your evaluation of the case. “Race-switching” involves imagining the
same events, the same circumstances, the same people, but switching the races of
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the parties and witnesses. For example, if the accused is African-American and the
accuser is White, you should imagine a White accused and an African-American
accuser. If your evaluation of the case is different after engaging in race-switching,
this suggests a subconscious reliance on stereotypes. You must then reevaluate the
case from a neutral, unbiased perspective.

Id. at 24.
7. Geoffrey J. Orr, Toward a Workable Civil Presumptions Rule in Louisiana,
53 La. L. Rev. 1625, 1629 (1993).
8. The Uniform Probate Code provides that an individual is presumed dead
if he or she is “absent for a continuous period of 5 years, during which he (or she)
has not been heard from, and whose absence is not satisfactorily explained after
diligent search or inquiry.” u.p.c. § 1-107(5) (1990).
9. See Cathy Lynne Bosworth, Pretrial Detainment: The Fruitless Search for the
Presumption of Innocence, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 277 (1986) (documenting the history
of the presumption of innocence and how the presumption has evolved in recent
times).
10. See Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law:
The True Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 Duke L.J. 1031 (2003). Jones asserts
that the theoretical justification for criminal punishment in the American criminal
justice system is based on the idea that “offenders have made a voluntary choice to
break the law, thus validating the imposition of a societal sanction.” Id. at 1031.
11. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court,
31 Ucla L. Rev. 503 (1984). Walkover explains:
The common law’s resolution of this basic tension between culpability and
juvenile status was lodged in the infancy defense. This defense constituted a
series of presumptions that embodied largely intuitive judgments concerning a
child’s capacity to take responsibility for individual acts. These presumptions had
the effect of screening out the non-culpable from treatment as adult offenders.
Children under the age of seven were conclusively presumed to be incapable of
taking responsibility for their acts and thus were precluded from criminal adjudication. Children over the age of fourteen were regarded as adults and thus were
presumed capable of committing crimes. Between these two ages the common law
created a rebuttable presumption of incapacity.

Id. at 511. The u.s. Supreme Court created a strong presumption when it held
last week in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that it is cruel and unusual
punishment to execute an individual who was under the age of 18 at the time he
committed the crime.
12. Consider the following classics: “It doesn’t matter.” “No one will find out.”
“No one will be hurt.” “I’m sure this case is still good law.” “These partners will be
friends forever.” “I can handle this matter.” “I’ve still got time.” The list is virtually
endless.
13. No gender implication is intended by the use of the informal term “guy,”
and hopefully none will be inferred.
14. See John M. Kang, Deconstructing the Ideology of White Aesthetics, 2 Mich.
J. Race & L. 283 (1997). Kang reports that during World War ii, when American
sentiment toward the Japanese was strongly negative, the Los Angeles Times published the following: “A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched—so
a Japanese American, born of Japanese parents—grows up to be Japanese, not an
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American.” Id. at 329. In addition, u.s. World War ii propaganda often depicted
Japanese soldiers with “buck teeth, slanted eyes and with thick glasses.” Id.
15. Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity xi (Henry Hardy
ed., 1991) (quoting Immanuel Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in
weltbürgerlicher Absicht [1784]).
16. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 159 (1993).
17. Elkhonon Goldberg, The Wisdom Paradox: How Your Mind Can
Grow Stronger as Your Brain Grows Older 9 (2005). Dr. Goldberg observes,
“With age, the number of real-life cognitive tasks requiring a painfully effortful,
deliberate creation of new mental constructs seems to be diminishing. Instead,
problem-solving (in the broadest sense) takes increasingly the form of pattern
recognition.” Id. at 20.
18. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without
Thinking 12 (2005).
19. Id. at 12–13.
20. Id. at 250. Gladwell adds, “What the classical musical world realized was
that what they had thought was a pure and powerful first impression—listening to
someone play—was in fact hopelessly corrupted.” Id. at 250–51.
21. “Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of thine
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